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"The man that hath no music in himself,
Nor is not moved with concord of sweet sounds,
Is fit for treasons, stratagems and spoils."'
INTRODUCTION
Under the law's current formulation, musicians and composers alike
can be held liable for infringement when they incorporate pre-existing
musical snippets into their musical works, or when the two pieces are
said to be "substantially similar."2 The ultimate test for assessing when
two pieces are substantially similar is whether the second composer has
taken what is "pleasing to the ears" of the lay listener.3 Although this
legal standard ostensibly comports with our traditional understanding of
how copyright law should function, there are both persuasive policy and
pragmatic justifications for recalibrating this legal test and providing a
retrofitted legal standard that harmonizes more beautifully with the reali-
ties of the world of music.
With the demise of Napster, the rise of peer-to-peer networking, and
the onslaught of litigation orchestrated by the RIAA, the topic of music
copyright has been thrust to the fore in business, scholarly, and policy-
making circles. Copyright holders are scrambling to protect their coveted
music monopolies.4 Scholars are grappling with intricate and nuanced
legal and sociological issues regarding the Internet community's pen-
chant for sharing music files and how that reality should be addressed
Policy makers are grasping for the ever-evasive answers as to how the
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 5, sc. 1.
2. See, e.g., Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F3d 477, 485 (9th Cir. 2000).
3. See Arnstein v. Porter 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946) ("The question, therefore, is
whether defendant took from plaintiff's works so much of what is pleasing to the ears of lay
listeners, who comprise the audience for whom such popular music is composed, that defen-
dant wrongfully appropriated something which belongs to the plaintiff.").
4. As of the date this Article was printed, the Recording Industry Association of Amer-
ica ("RIAA") has filed approximately 900 individual lawsuits in an attempt to dissuade
individuals from using Peer-to-Peer ("P2P") networking capabilities to download music files
protected by copyright. See http://www.heraldtribune.conm/apps/pbcs.dll/article (last visited
Feb. 25, 2004). Interestingly enough, the NDP Group, Inc., a New York-based sales and mar-
keting company that measures trends in music consumption by the masses, indicated that there
was an increase in the number of households and individual consumers using P2P services to
download digital music files in the final months of 2003. http://home.businesswire.com/portal/
site/google/index.jsp?ndmViewId=newsview&newsld=20040116005098&newsLang=en (last
visited Feb. 25, 2004).
5. See, e.g., David L. Lange, Student, Music and The Net: A Comment on Peer-to-Peer
File Sharing, 2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 21 (2003); Lydia Pallas Loren, Untangling the Web
of Music Copyrights, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 673 (2003); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charis-
matic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence of Cooperation on the File-Swapping
Networks, 89 VA. L. REv. 505 (2003).
Musical Musings
law should be deployed and applied in the world of networked file-
swapping, particularly in the context of music copyrights.6
This Article focuses on the topic of music copyright, but addresses
this legal issue from a different vantage point than that of the industry
insiders, insightful scholars, and policy makers that have weighed in on
the debate. Instead of focusing on the issues regarding wholesale digital
reproduction and dissemination of music protected by copyright, this
Article focuses on music copyright infringement when the claim is that a
given piece of music is "substantially similar" to another piece of music
protected by copyright.
Part I of this Article touches on the history of the music industry and
copyright in this country, as well as the legal standard developed and
used by the federal judiciary in assessing whether a given piece of music
infringes upon another musical work. Examination of these histories will
help illuminate the shortcomings of the music copyright legal doctrine in
the succeeding sections.
Part II of this Article discusses the unique attributes possessed by
music and why these attributes call for treating music differently than
other works of authorship under copyright law.
Part III shifts from policy to pragmatics. Not only is the current test
for copyright infringement ill-suited based on the unique characteristics
of music, the test also has significant practical problems that need to be
addressed and remedied. This test-the "substantially similar" test-is
flawed because it assumes that there is only one reasonable7 way to per-
ceive a piece of music. This flaw is perpetuated by two factual
assumptions underlying the analysis: not-so-expert testimony and aurally
challenged jurors.8
Part IV posits a new paradigm for dealing with music copyright
when the claim is that a piece of music is "substantially similar" to a pre-
existing musical work protected by copyright. Instead of having a regime
that restricts musical borrowing, we should have a system that encour-
ages this practice, so long as the second composer pays the first
composer pursuant to a compulsory license. Implementing this compul-
sory license requirement squares with the underlying realities of the
music world. Moreover, the beneficial byproducts of such a system are
manifest and include predictability, judicial economy, and pecuniary in-
centives flowing to music copyright holders and the music copyright
borrowers.
6. In late 2003, the Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings on the issue of peer-to-
peer networking, its problems, and some solutions. See http://www.copyright.gov/docs/
regstat090903.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2004).
7. Id.
8. See infra Part IVII.C.
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I. A HISTORICAL SKETCH OF MUSIC COPYRIGHT
For the copyright and music enthusiast, the history and development
of the legal regime regarding music copyright is a fascinating and fiend-
ishly complex one. 9 In looking at the development of music copyright
law, it is evident that both Congress and the courts have historically
treated music just like other types of works of authorship, and, conse-
quently have approached the legal issues of protection and infringement
of music like those other types. While this like-treatment rationale may
have had a superficial appeal in days gone by, sociological and techno-
logical changes, as well as a survey of the historical practices of the
music composition process, challenge the efficacy of this "one-size-fits-
all" formulation.
To fully appreciate how music copyright coverage developed, and to
understand its shortcomings in its present form, it is helpful to examine
the music industry's complex transformation and growth, and how copy-
right protection has canvassed the interests of that industry along the
way.
A. The Nascent Years of Music Copyright, 1800-1850
In the early days of the 1800s, American diversion and entertainment
was far different than it is today, and music played a far different role in
the life of the average American. One of the primary modes of musical
entertainment then consisted of parlor settings where the American fam-
ily would gather around the piano or the family instrument of choice and
listen to the anointed musician play works by the masters as well as
other musical compositions of the day.'0 Thus, the music that was con-
sumed by the public of those days was primarily printed sheet music."
Music publishers consisted primarily of classical music publishers, mu-
sic store owners, and local printing shops that would sell music along
side other printed materials such as books and magazines. 2 Popular
sheet music was sold in stores owned by these music publishers and
traveling salesmen were commissioned to carry music selections with
them on their travels to various geographic outposts.
13
9. See Loren, supra note 5, at 699.
10. See Vladimir J. Konecni, Social Interaction and Musical Preference, in THE PSY-
CHOLOGY OF Music 499 (Diana Deutsch ed. 1982).
11. The public also attended performances of such musical offerings as ballad-operas
and minstrel shows. See DAVID EWEN, PANORAMA OF AMERICAN POPULAR MUSIC 64 (1957).
12. DAVID A. JASEN, TIN PAN ALLEY: THE COMPOSERS, THE SONGS AND THEIR TIMES,
at xvi (1988).
13. Id. As Mr. Jasen noted, "[o]ne thinks of Meredith Willson's Professor Harold Hill in
The Music Man as a humorous caricature of these early music publishers." Id.
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Pursuant to the efforts of those in the music publishing enterprise,
copyright law first intersected with music in 1831.' 4 Under this newly-
minted law, the owner of the copyright in a musical composition was
provided the same rights as enjoyed by the copyright owner of a book or
a map, viz., "the sole right and liberty of reprinting, publishing and
vending such... [work] . . . in the whole or in part."'5 Exactly how much
copying of a musical work would be actionable back then, just like now,
was within the province of the judiciary. 6 In deciding that question, the
courts tended to analyze music infringement claims much like they had
analyzed infringement claims involving other works of authorship under
the copyright laws.
For example, Jollie v. Jaques was one of the very first music copy-
right cases reported. The dispute in Jollie was based on a claim that the
second musical work was "similar in plan or matter to, or [was] a sub-
stantial copy" of the plaintiff's work.'" In explaining the protection
afforded to musical works under the Copyright Act, Jollie noted that:
The appropriation of the whole or of any substantial part of it
without the license of the author is a piracy. How far the appro-
priation might be carried in the arrangement and composition of
a new piece of music, without an infringement, is a question that
must be left to the facts in each particular case. If the new air be
substantially the same as the old, it is no doubt a piracy; and the
adaptation of it, either by changing it to a dance, or by transfer-
ring it from one instrument to another, if the ear detects the same
air in the new arrangement, will not relieve it from the penalty
The new arrangement and adaptation must not be allowed to in-
corporate such parts and portions of it as may seriously interfere
with the right of the author; otherwise the copy-right would be
worthless.' 9
Jollie represents a significant development of the legal standard for
music copyright infringement in at least two respects. First, Jollie set the
judicial precedent for treating music in the exact same fashion as any
other work protected by copyright. This precedent subsists to this very
14. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, Ch. XVI, § 4.
15. Id. Ch. XVI, § 1.
16. The Copyright Act has never explicitly defined what constitutes "music copyright
infringement." Instead, the copyright statute "leaves the development of the fundamentals to
the judges" who have been consulted at nearly every turn. See BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UN-
HURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 40 (1967).
17. 13 F.Cas 910 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1850) (No. 7437).
18. Id. at 913.
19. Id. at 913-14.
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day. Second, the legal framework employed by Jollie-the "substantially
similar" metric, the use of expert testimony, and the protection of the
plaintiff's market-is essentially the same framework under which the
federal judiciary currently labors when assessing music copyright in-
fringement claims.20
It is important to note that at this time in American history, the music
"industry" functioned much like other industries that were providing
works of authorship to the public: printing copies and selling those hard
copies to the public through retail outlets and roving salesmen.2' Because
music had similar commercial qualities to books, it made conceptual
sense that Congress and the courts would treat music just like any other
work protected by copyright." As social and technological realities
changed, however, music began to take on a different function in the
lives of the American citizenry in the latter part of the nineteenth cen-
tury. Yet, despite these changes, Congress and the courts did not alter
their positions as to what constituted music copyright infringement.
B. The Music Industry Gains Steam, 1850-1900
In the later years of the 1800s, popular music began to gain promi-
nence with the rank-and-file American household. At the end of the Civil
War, piano sales began to increase every year and by 1887 there wereover500000 outs stdyig " 23
over 500,000 youths studying piano. During this steady rise in piano
purchasing, demand for sheet music began to increase as well. By the
end of the nineteenth century, New York City was becoming an impor-
tant hub of musical and artistic culture.24 Far-flung music publishers
began flocking to Manhattan and steadily built a mecca of music pub-
lishing on Twenty-eighth Street, ultimately dubbed "Tin Pan Alley."
25
20. See infra Part HI.
21. See JASEN, supra note 12, at xvi.
22. As argued infra, treating works of music like any other artistic or literary endeavor
for purposes of copyright infringement necessarily ignores a long-stranding tradition and
history of the music composition process. See infra Part II.A.
23. See America's Music Publishing Industry, The Story of Tin Pan Alley, at
http://www.parlorsongs.com/insearch/tinpanalley/tinpanalley.asp (last visited February 25,
2004).
24. Id.
25. WILLIAM G. HYLAND, THE SONG is ENDED: SONGWRITERS AND AMERICAN MUSIC,
1900-1950 5 (1995). Music world lore provides that songwriter and journalist Monroe
Rosenfeld coined the term "Tin Pan Alley." As the legend goes, one day just before 1900,
Rosenfeld passed the publishing houses on Twenty-eighth and was taken aback by the ca-
cophony of pianos and voices emanating therefrom. The coalescence of all these sounds
remined him of "tin pans clanging together." Later that day, Rosenfeld return to his desk at the
New York Herald to type a story about the place he just visited, the "Tin Pan Alley." See R.
GRANT SMITH, FROM SAGINAW VALLEY TO TIN PAN ALLEY, SAGINAW'S CONTRIBUTION TO
AMERICAN POPULAR MUSIC, 1890-1955 24 (1998).
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Alley publishers began hiring skilled musicians to write songs that
would be sold in sheet music form to the public.26 Alley publishers re-
tained singers to canvas music venues to "plug" these new songs to help
drive consumer demand for the publishers' sheet music. 27 Publishers be-
gan dressing up their sheet music with filigreed artwork, pictures of
well-known crooners, and other alluring articles that would help leverage
transactions with the consuming public. 2' By the waning days of the 19th
Century, American popular music was in full-tilt mode and sheet music
sales were blossoming.29
It was at this time that the music industry started functioning differ-
ently than it had over the last several decades. Music no longer catered to
a one-dimensional desire that could be fulfilled through the sales of
printed music. Vaudeville entertainment shows, as well as similar types
of public musical diversion, were beginning to attract wider audiences. 0
Music copyright holders began to realize the potential revenue streams
that were available for public performances of their musical pieces that
were being voraciously consumed by the public. Consequently, in 1897,
at the behest of those in the music industry, copyright law was amended
to give the copyright holder the exclusive right to publicly perform the
music "for profit."'" At first, this right was difficult for music copyright
holders to enforce, as restaurants and many other public venues did not
charge a price for admission. Consequently, several key players in the
music publishing industry came together and formed the American Soci-
ety of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP), a collective of
music copyright holders that would band together to help enforce their
public performance copyrights. 2 It would be several years and several
court battles later until ASCAP would be able to effectively administer
and enforce the public performance rights owned by its constituents.
3
26. Musical giants such as George Gershwin, Jerome Kern, Cole Porter and Irving
Berlin were all Alley men. See JASEN, supra note 12.
27. The name of the business game was "song promotion." As one author pointed out
"anywhere and everywhere people congregated was fair game: vaudeville, bars, lobster pal-
aces, theaters, beer gardens, brothels, nickelodeons." JASEN, supra note 12, at xvii.
28. Id. at xviii.
29. See id. at xvi.
30. EWEN, supra note 11, at 79-82.
31. See Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481-82; amended by Act of Mar. 4, 1909,
ch. 320, § 25, 35 Stat. 1081.
32. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL
JUKEBOX 68-69 (1994).
33. See id. at 68-70; see also Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 593-95 (1917) (holding
that "the performance of a copyrighted musical composition in a restaurant or hotel without
charge for admission... infringes the exclusive right of the owner of the copyright to perform
the work publicly for profit" (citing Act of March 4, 1909, c.320, § 1 (e), 35 Stat. 1075)).
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By the end of the nineteenth century, music copyright holders en-
joyed the right to vend copies of their sheet music and to publicly
perform their musical compositions. Further, the legal analysis deployed
in Jollie was alive and well and the judiciary was ostensibly ready to
declare any musical work that was "substantially similar" to another
work as a violation of the copyright laws.34 Thus, the copyright holders
had control over the two main modes by which the public consumed mu-
sic during the day, but the granting of additional rights by Congress and
a strengthening of those rights by the judiciary was still in the offing.
C. Innovation and Popular Music, 1900-1950
Technology. That one word encapsulates a confluence of forces that
permanently altered the musical landscape in 20th Century America.
From the invention of the phonograph to the radio, and other music im-
plements in between, music began to seep into the American culture
unlike at any other time up to that point in our history.
The seeds were sewn for the music industry's trajectory change in
the latter part of the 1800s. In 1877, Thomas Edison invented the phono-
graph, a recording device using a metal cylinder with tin foil to capture
and record sound.35 One of the many uses immediately foreseen by Edi-
son for the phonograph was the "reproduction of music."36 A few years
later, Alexander Graham Bell invented the graphophone, an improve-
ment upon the original Edison invention . In 1887, the German
immigrant Emile Berliner invented the "gramophone", a recording
mechanism that used flat discs or "records" to capture sound.38 The
gramophone had the distinct advantage that would allow copies to be
made from the original imprint on the disk, which would facilitate mass
copying.39 Berliner founded the "The Gramophone Company" and
started the process of recruiting musical artists to record music for
34. See, e.g., Blume v. Spear, 30 F. 629, 631 (C.C.N.Y. 1887). The court stated:
Upon the question of infringement there is not much room for doubt. The theme or
melody of the music is substantially the same in the copyrighted and the alleged in-
fringing pieces. The measure of the former is followed in the latter, and is
somewhat peculiar. When played by a competent musician, they appear to be really
the same. There are variations, but they are so placed as to indicate that the former
was taken deliberately, rather than that the latter was a new piece.
Id.
35. See The History of the Edison Cylinder Phonograph, at http://
memory.loc.gov/ammem/edhtml/edcyldr.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2004).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See Emile Berliner-The History of the Gramaphone, at http://inventors.about.com/
library/inventors/blgramophone.htm
39. Id.
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gramophonic reproduction and sale to the public.4' By 1893, these coin
operated talking machines had spread throughout the country and were
beginning to crop up in "parlors, hotel lobbies, and train stations.'"'
Similarly, the consuming public began to acquire these new talking ma-
chines as well.42
In 1894, Edwin Votey invented the pianola, the precursor to the
player piano, and within less than a decade there were approximately
"seventy-five thousand player pianos in the United States and about one
million piano rolls sold." By 1910, and after the U.S. Supreme Court
and Congress had dealt with the underlying copyright issues,45 the player
piano had significant attraction in the American market and sales of
these instruments would flourish for several years.46 This flourishing
would eventually wane due to the rise in popularity of recorded and
broadcast music. In 1922, RCA introduced "radio music box'" the "ra-
diola," into the consumer market.4'7 By 1937 there were "twenty-seven
million [radio] sets in general use, and more than 500 stations sup-
ply[ing] them with programs throughout the United States."" All of
these inventions added new layers of musical infusion into all sectors of
society.
As music became more common place in the work-a-day world and
as music composers continued churning out made-to-order music, law-
suits ballooned over claims that pieces of music were "substantially
similar" to other pieces. In just a thirty-five year increment between
1915 and 1950, there were twenty-three reported federal cases directly
centered on this specific music copyright issue.49 This is nearly a ten-fold
40. Id.
41. See Thomas Edison, Intellectual Property, and the Recording Industry, at
http://www.mp3newswire.net/stories/2003/monopoly.htm1 (last visited Feb. 25, 2004).
42. Id.
43. ARTHUR REBLITZ, PLAYER PIANO 1 (1985).
44. EDWARD SAMUELS, THE ILLUSTRATED STORY OF COPYRIGHT 34 (2000).
45. See White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo, 209 U.S. 1 (1908) (holding that
mechanical reproduction of musical works protected by copyright did not infringe copyright
holders' exclusive rights). Congress amended the Copyright Act the following year to ex-
pressly overrule the Court's determination.
46. See REBLITZ, supra note 43, at I.
47. See EDWARD BLISS, JR., NOW THE NEWS 6 (1991). In 1915, David Sarnoff, the
then-future chairman of RCA, wrote what has been dubbed "the most renowned piece of paper
in the history of broadcasting." This memorandum declared Sarnoff's idea that the radio could
act as a purveyor of music instead of just a transmitter of messages. The memorandum states
in part, "I have in mind a plan of development which would make radio a 'household utility' in
the same sense as the piano or phonograph. The idea is to bring music into the home by wire-
less .... The box can be placed on a table in the parlor or living room, the switch set
accordingly and the music received." See id. at 5.
48. See ROBERT EICHBERG, RADIO STARS OF TODAY 1 (1937).
49. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946); Heim v. Universal Pictures Co.,
154 E2d 480 (2d Cir. 1946); Brodsky v. Universal Pictures Co., 149 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1945);
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increase compared to the preceding eighty-four year period." Although
the courts began refining the actual legal test for music copyright in-
fringement, the basic analytical blueprint handed down from Jollie
decades earlier would remain the same. Of these twenty-three reported
cases, the most significant of the lot is likely the venerable Arnstein v.
Porter,5' handed down by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit.
In Arnstein v. Porter, the claim was that the vaunted American
songwriter Cole Porter had infringed several musical copyrights of the
irascible Ira Arnstein. Arnstein was a litigious immigrant from the Soviet
Union who for ten years dogged the likes of various songwriters, 20th
Century Fox, ASCAP, and BMI, claiming that they all had infringed on
his music copyrights.52 Arnstein v. Porter was the final music copyright
case pursued by Arnstein and the court's decision gave Arnstein a nearly
53imperfect 1-4 record in music copyright litigation cases.
Porter is significant to the history of music copyright infringement
because it sets forth a refined legal standard for music copyright in-
fringement claims, the standard that is still used by the federal judiciary
today. Under Porter, music copyright infringement analysis is grounded
in a two-part test. Accordingly, the plaintiff must establish: (a) that de-
fendant copied from plaintiff's copyrighted work and (b) "that the
copying (assuming it to be proved) went to[sic] far as to constitute im-
proper appropriation. 54 On the first issue, "analysis ('dissection') is
relevant, and the testimony of experts may be received to aid the trier of
Arnstein v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 137 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1943); Darrell v. Joe Morris Music
Co., 113 F.2d (2d Cir. 1940); Arnstein v. Edward B. Marks Music Corp., 82 F 2d 275 (2d Cir.
1936); Hirsch v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 816 (S.D. Cal. 1937); Marks v. Leo
Feist, Inc., 290 F. 959 (2d Cir. 1923); Baron v. Leo Feist, 78 F Supp. 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1948);
Jewel Music v. Leo Feist, 62 F. Supp. 596 (S.D.N.Y. 1945); Arnstein v. Twentieth Century-Fox
Film, 52 F Supp. 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); McMahon v. Harms, Inc., 42 F Supp. 779 (S.D.N.Y.
1942); Carew v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, 43 F Supp. 199 (S.D. Cal. 1942); Allen v. Walt Disney
Prod. Ltd., 41 F Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); Davilla v. Harms, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 843
(S.D.N.Y. 1940); Arnstein v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors, and Publishers, 29 F. Supp.
388 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); Norden v. Oliver Ditson Co., 13 F. Supp. 415 (D. Mass. 1936); Wilkie v.
Santly Bros., Inc., 13 F Supp. 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1935); Italian Book Co., v. Rossi, 27 F2d 1014
(S.D.N.Y. 1928); Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1924); Haas v. Leo
Feist, Inc., 234 F. 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1916); Boosey v. Empire Music Co., 224 F 646 (S.D.N.Y.
1915); Hein v. Harris, 175 F 875 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910), aff'd, 183 Fed. 107 (2d Cir. 1923).
50. See Reed v. Carusi, 20 F Cas. 431 (C.C.D. Md. 1845) (No. 11,642); Jollie v.
Jaques, 13 F Cas. 910 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1850) (No. 7, 437); Blume v. Spear, 30 F 629
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1887); Cooper v. James, 213 F 871 (N.D. Ga. 1914).
51. See Porter, 154 F.2d at 464.
52. See Columbia Law School Music Plagiarism Project, at http://
www.library.law.columbia.edu/music-plagiarism/case-page.html (last visited February 25,
2004).
53. Id.
54. See Porter, 154 F.2d at 468.
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the facts."55 In this regard, the "judgment of trained musicians" is used to
compare the "respective musical compositions" in order to help the
plaintiff establish that copying occurred. 6 If there is copying, the analy-
sis proceeds to the next issue of whether this copying can be considered
"illicit appropriation." Illicit appropriation ultimately turns on "whether
defendant took from plaintiff's works so much of what is pleasing to the
ears of lay listeners, who comprise the audience for whom such popular
music is composed, that defendant wrongfully appropriated something
which belongs to the plaintiff."57The "lay listener" is an ordinary reason-
able person." Expert testimony is not allowed on the second prong to
prove illicit appropriation, however, the expert testimony of musicians
may be presented to the trier of fact "to assist in determining the reac-
tions of lay auditors."59 As Porter was becoming ensconced in the federal
reporter at the dawn of the 1950s, the music copyright holders were in a
prime economic position. By this time, music copyright holders owned
the exclusive rights to sheet music reproductions, mechanical reproduc-
tions of their music,' public performances, and arrangements or
adaptations of their musical compositions. All of these elements of con-
trol would inhere to the benefit of music copyright holders as the next
wave of technological and social changes would occur.
D. The Soaring Musical Decades, 1950-Today
By the 1950s, the music industry was a multi-dimensional being that
had at its disposal many techniques and abilities to reach the consuming
public with music. The industry had far outpaced its humble beginnings
of simply offering copies of sheet music for sale. Indeed, music publish-
ing was no longer the preeminent method of choice for the music
industry to peddle its wares to the masses. The parlor piano eventually
gave way to 22,000 phonographs, millions of radios, multitudes of disk
jockeys, and 500,000 jukeboxes.6' Country Western and Rhythm & Blues
were beginning to fuse to create the phenomenon of Rock 'n' Roll,
62which was receiving the attention and admiration of younger audiences.
The advent of the television and its relevance and prominence in the
55. Id.
56. Id. at 473.
57. Id.
58. See Northern Music Corp. v. King Record Distrib. Co., 105 F. Supp. 393, 397
(D.C.N.Y. 1952) (noting that the standard is whether the "average hearer" would detect no-
ticeable resemblance).
59. Porter, 154 F.2d at 473.
60. Subject to the compulsory license provisions.
61. See IRVING SABLOSKY, AMERICAN Music 175 (1969).
62. See JASEN, supra note 12, at 280-81.
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American household, once again, added a new mouthpiece to the musi-
cal mix of the average American life. The rise of these disk jockey
personalities, the brash new sounds of the music emanating from radios
and TVs, and the new and innovative techniques used in recording music
permanently altered the landscape of the popular music industry. 63 A new
and lucrative musical era was born, and the music industry was perfectly
poised to tap into this treasure trove that was awaiting it.64 And tapped it
did.
Since the 1950s, musical inundation of the public has increased with
every technological and social turn. The advent of the cassette deck and,
ultimately, compact disks helped facilitate rapid-fire copying by, and
exchange of musical compositions between, the consuming public.65 Per-
sonal listening devices such as the Sony Walkman, the next generation
Apple iPod, and other like-minded devices have allowed and encouraged
individualized music consumption not only at home, but at school, work,
exercise venues, and every and any public or private venue in between.
66
The Internet has made procurement of all types of music incredibly easy,
and monstrously cost effective, which has lured users to this new me-
67dium in unparalleled droves. In addition to the technological advances
that helped the catapulting of music consumption in the last decade in
particular, marketing and merchandising efforts of the music industry
reinforced the musical messages and helped drive demand for more mu-
61sic, in more venues, for more consumers.
During this continued rise of the tides in the market for music since
the 1950s, music copyright infringement suits have continued to become
more plentiful. From 1950 through 2000, there were forty-three reported
cases dealing with music copyright infringement-nearly twice as many
as compared to the period between 1900-1950-and many more disputes
that never ripened into litigation as a result of out-of-court settlements.69
63. Id.
64. It would still be several years before copyright protection would exist for sound
recordings, but these too were eventually given protection in 1971 under an amendment to the
Copyright Act. See The Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391.
65. See Martin F Halstead, The Regulated Become the Regulators, Problems and Pit-
falls in the New World of Digital Copyright Legislation, 38 TULSA L.J. 195, 199 (2001).
66. Ida C. Shum, Getting "Ripped" Off By Copy-Protected CDs, 29 J. LEGIS. 125, 129
(2002).
67. See Strahilevitz, supra note 5, at 507 ("[A]t its peak Napster had approximately 70
million users.").
68. See Shae Yatta Harvey, National, Multi-District Preliminary Tour Injunctions: Why
the Hesitation?, 40 IDEA 195, 217 (2000).
69. For example, Vanilla Ice, Brian Wilson of The Beach Boys, and Ray Parker Jr. were
all accused of music copyright infringement. See http://www.rollingstone.com/features/
featuregen.asp?pid= 1901.
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Several renowned musical artists7" were accused of infringement during
this period and, by and large the judiciary responded and handed down
opinions that were wholly consistent with the prevailing notions of what
constituted music copyright infringement. In other words, the standard
for music copyright infringement was the same in 2000 as it had been in
1850, viz., "appropriation of the whole or of any substantial part of [a
piece of music] without the license of the author is a piracy.
'' 7'
E. Coda
The above recitation is certainly not a complete picture of the inter-
play between Congress, the courts, and music copyright holders over the
years. It does, however, provide enough of a context to demonstrate three
key points. First, music copyright law came into existence in the early
1800s when music played a far less significant role in the American exis-
tence and when music was far more of a one-dimensional entity, much
like a book, a map, or other work of authorship. Thus, it superficially
made sound policy to treat music like those other commodities. Second,
as music evolved from mere diversion into obtaining a far more promi-
nent stature in society, music copyright law remained stagnant and did
not take into account, at either the congressional or judicial levels, the
cultural and technological changes that fundamentally altered the way
music is consumed by the public. Further, Congress and the courts have
never given much attention to the historical practices of musicians and
how this practice is at fundamental odds with the past and current formu-
lation of music copyright law. As discussed in Part 11, it is now time to
consider these countervailing interests and whether the current balance
struck between music copyright holders and society should still hold
sway.
II. COPYRIGHT COLLISIONS
This country has witnessed numerous social and technological
changes over the last 100 years. Notwithstanding this transformation,
music copyright law has remained a consistently static entity. The basic
and essentially exclusive philosophical inquiry posed by music copyright
70. See Fogerty v. Fantasy, 510 U.S. 517 (1994) (John Fogerty); Three Boys Music v.
Bolton, 212 F.3d 477 (9th Cir. 2000) (Michael Bolton); Repp v. Webber, 132 F.3d 882 (2d Cir.
1997) (Andrew Lloyd Weber); Crystal Cartier v. Jackson, 59 F.3d 1046 (10th Cir. 1995) (Mi-
chael Jackson); Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1987) (John Williams); Selle v.
Gibb, 741 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1984) (Bee Gees); Bright Tunes Music v. Harrisongs Music, 420
F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (George Harrison).
71. Compare Jollie v. Jaques, 13 F Cas. 910, 913-14 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1850) (No. 7,
437), with Three Boys Music, 212 F.3d at 485-87.
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legislators and judicial decision makers has been this: are music copy-
right owners being adequately protected from others' use of the musical
material?7 ' This persistent question has neither been deviated from when
Congress has passed laws effecting music copyright owners nor on the
judiciary's watch when it has been faced with questions of music copy-
right infringement.
Although ensuring that music copyright holders are being ade-
quately incentivized to create additional works of music is undeniably
important, so too is the effect of this music on those who consume and
listen to it. Copyright law is to exist for the singular purpose of enriching
the public domain and the music copyright holders' interests-pecuniary
or otherwise-are subordinate to that important end game. 73 For far too
long copyright laws, though, have been too heavily calibrated in favor of
the music copyright holders and have overlooked at least three important
S 74
sociological and cultural aspects of how the world of music functions.
Those three considerations are discussed here and when cumulatively
considered they provide a compelling justification for reexamining the
scope and reach of the current copyright laws pertaining to music.
A. There's Something About Music
The first consideration that has been essentially left out of the music
copyright calculus in both the congressional and judicial spheres is the
important distinction between music and other art forms.75 More so than
72. See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 36 (2001). Noting that:
A century ago, Congress confronted the dilemma of updating and simplifying a
body of law that seemed too complicated and arcane for legislative revision. To
solve that problem, Congress and the Copyright Office settled on a scheme for
statutory drafting that featured meetings and negotiations among representatives of
industries with interests in copyright.
Id.
73. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (noting that
"[t]he immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an 'author's' creative
labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general
public good").
74. Additionally, one author has noted that copyright law is a self-perpetuating cycle
that "works a disservice on unestablished songwriters." See Aaron Keyt, An Improved Frame-
work For Music Plagiarism Litigation, 76 CAL. L. REv. 421, 423 (1988) (arguing that
infringement suits are costly and, therefore, established record companies are loathe to listen
to submissions from artists for fear of being sued, which ultimately hurts the industry in the
long run).
75. Id. at 422 (opining that "[w]hile the copyright system applies to many sorts of intel-
lectual property, from music to industrial sculpture, the ideal balance may differ according to
the expressive medium involved. Thus, to effectuate the balance, different rules and factual
inquires may be necessary depending on the type of creative work at issue"); see also Matthew
W. Daus, The Abrogation of Expert Dissection In Popular Music Copyright Infringement
Cases: Suggested Modifications For The Implementation of The Lay Listener Standard, 8
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any other artistic endeavors, music possesses ethereal qualities that infil-
trates and permeates multiple facets of our existence in a complex
manner.76 As the social philosopher Theodor Adorno wrote, "of all the
arts, music is the prototypical example of this: It is at once completely
enigmatic and totally evident. It cannot be solved, only its form can be
deciphered .... 17 The famous American composer Aaron Copeland has
written that music constitutes "[t]he freest, the most abstract, the least
fettered of all the arts: no story content, no pictorial representation, no
regularity of meter, no strict limitation of frame need hamper the intui-
tive functioning of the imaginative mind.78 These sentiments are borne
out as evidenced by the significant chasm of disagreement between
many scientists and musicologists as to the origins of music and why we
humans produce it.79 Although the qualities music possesses may still be
largely enigmatic to those who toil over the topic, there is widespread
consensus cutting across academic disciplines regarding the effects that
music has.8°
There is no question that music speaks to us in mysterious and pro-
found ways and invokes within us numerous physiological and
emotional responses. Even before birth, humans respond to music."
Shortly thereafter, music moves babies to relax, clap, sway with the beat,
and even sing (albeit usually in a non-tuneful manner).82 Indeed, mount-
ing evidence suggests that babies-both born and unborn-are "as
responsive to music as the most avid concertgoers. '' 3 No other artistic
stimulus enjoys a response of this nature from such a young and uniniti-
ated group.
TOURO L. REV. 615 (1992) (observing that "[m]usic is an exceptional art form which deserves
separate treatment under the copyright laws").
76. Since ancient times, music has been treated as an art form different from the others.
See, e.g., THE GREAT DIALOGUES OF PLATO 197-217 (W.H.D. Rouse trans., 1956); L. MEYER,
EMOTION AND MEANING IN Music (1956); John W. Holt, Protecting America's Youth: Can
Rock Music Lyrics Be Regulated, 16 J. CONTEMP. L. 53, 75 (1990).
77. See Carol Weisbrod, Fusion Folk: A Comment on Law and Music, 20 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1439 (1999).
78. See AARON COPLAND, MUSIC AND IMAGINATION 17 (1952).
79. See, e.g., STEVEN PINKER, HOW THE MIND WORKS 526-28 (1997) (arguing that
music is simply a technology or "auditory cheesecake" that is crafted to tickle the sensitive
spots of mental faculties and arguing that other claims about music's origin are incorrect). But
see, Jean Molino, Toward an Evolutionary Theory of Music, in THE ORIGINS OF Music 165
(Nils L. Wallin et al. eds., 2000) (arguing that music and language have a common origin and
evolution).
80. See WHITE HOUSE COMMISSION ON COMPLEMENTARY AND ALTERNATIVE MEDI-
CINE, FINAL REPORT 1 (2002), available at http://www.whccamp.hhs.gov/pdfs/fr2002-
document.pdf. See also Kathleen M. Boozang, National Policy on CAM: The White House
Commission Report, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 251, 253 (2003).
81. See DON CAMPBELL, THE MOZART EFFECT 18-26 (1997).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 23.
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Over the last couple of decades in particular, collegiate studies and
documented clinical experiments have examined the myriad ways that
music works its effects. For example, one clinician has noted that be-
cause "music reaches multiple areas of the brain" it can bring about
beneficial effects far different than other forms of communication. 84 An-
other noted scholar has indicated "there is something about its sheer
power to heal and revive the human spirit that seems to set it apart from
other arts. '85 Dr. Oliver Sachs, the renowned neurologist who treated pa-
tients with severe mental and physical maladies, indicated in his famous
book, Awakenings, that music was the most profound "non-chemical
medication."86 In commenting on how music allowed his patients to
function, he noted that "[t]he therapeutic power of music is very remark-
able, and may allow an ease of movement otherwise impossible. 87
Other scientists and researchers have observed that music can accel-
erate the learning process,88 boost productivity of a workforce, 9 heighten
immunological responses of cells,9° reduce muscle tension and improve
body movement, 9' and alter heartbeats, pulse rates, and blood pressure.
92
One psychologist poignantly observed that "music can penetrate the core
of our physical being."93 Because "music is a powerful communicative
force,"9' it also evokes a vast array of emotional responses from the re-
cipients of it. It inspires, consoles, motivates, awakens, and energizes us
84. See The Mozart Effect Resource Center, at http://www.mozarteffect.comlearn/
read.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2004).
85. See Josie Glausiusz, The Genetic Mystery of Music, DISCOVER, Vol. 22, No. 8
(Aug. 2001), available at http://www.spiritsound.com/mystery.html (last visited Feb. 25,
2004).
86. OLIVER SACHS, AWAKENINGS 237 (1981).
87. Id.
88. See generally, GEORGI LOZANOV, SUGGESTOLOGY AND OUTLINES OF SUG-
GESTOPEDY (1978); SHEILA OSTRANDER & LYNN SCHROEDER, SUPERLEARNING 2000 (1994).
89. The University of Washington indicated that in a study of ninety individuals copy-
editing a manuscript while listening to classical music, accuracy increased by approximately
21.3 percent. See Business Music, A Business Tool For The Office/Workplace (1991); see also
CAMPBELL, supra note 81, at 75.
90. In 1993, researchers from Michigan State University reported that listening to mu-
sic for fifteen minutes could increase levels of interleukin-I in the blood from 12.5 to 14
percent. Interleukins are the body of proteins associated with blood and platelet production,
lymphocyte stimulation, and cellular protection against maladies such as AIDS and cancer.
See CAMPBELL, supra note 81, at 72.
91. See Michael Thaut et al., Analysis of EMG Activity in Biceps and Triceps Muscle in
an Upper Extremity Gross Motor Task under the Influence of Auditory Rhythm, 28 J. OF Mu-
sIC THERAPY 64, 64-68 (1991).
92. BILL GOTTLIEB, SOUND THERAPY: NEW CHOICES IN NATURAL HEALING 127
(1995).
93. See ANTHONY STORR, MUSIC AND THE MIND 4 (1992).
94. See Holt, supra note 76, at 75.
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unlike other artistic endeavors. "It can make us weep or give us intense
pleasure."95
Although it is readily admitted by those who study music that we
still know relatively little about why music evokes such effects within
us,
9 6 there is no question that music enjoys a unique place among artistic
endeavors and the human experience associated therewith. Notwith-
standing this unique nature of music, it has traditionally been placed
within the economically-driven confines of copyright law and been de-
fined as simply another "work of authorship" commodity.97 This myopic
view of music is particularly problematic given the widely-held view
that we know relatively little about why music exerts the effects that it
does upon us.
Because of this lack of knowledge, and because we know for certain
that music can have enormously beneficial effects on people, the law
should be tailored to provide greater flexibility in the manner in whichS 98
people are allowed to respond to music that they perceive. Music
should not simply be viewed through a financial prism, but should also
be viewed through the lenses of the recipients of that music. Music ef-
fects people in profound ways, and the law should expect and allow the
responses to that art form to be of equal profundity.99
B. Music in Society
The second fundamental problem with our music copyright law is
that Congress and the courts have overlooked the reality that music is
inextricably intertwined in the daily lives of society and invades every
facet of our experience. The American musical experience of today is far
different than it was back in the 1800s and early 1900s.'0
95. See STORR, supra note 93, at 4.
96. See, e.g., PINKER, supra note 79, at 538.
97. See Christine Lepera and Michael Maneulin, Music Plagiarism: Notes on Prepar-
ing For Trial, 17 ENT. & SPORTS LAW 10, 11 (Fall 1999) (noting that copyright decisional law
"creates an all-purpose infringement analysis that is intended to apply to all subject matters of
copyright. That law was not specifically tailored to, and does not necessarily suit, music").
98. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 88-89 (2001) (arguing that when
society is uncertain how a given piece of intellectual property is going to be used "we have
more reason to keep that resource in the commons"); see also J. Michael Keyes, Whatever
Happens to Works Deferred?: Reflections on the Ill-Given Deferments of the Copyright Term
Extension Act, 26 SEA. L. REv. 97, 116 (2002).
99. See ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND 72-73 (1987) (arguing
that music in the days of Plato and Aristotle was "at the center of education" and that
"[c]lassical philosophy did not censor the singers. It persuaded them.").
100. See Konecni, infra note 11l, at 498 ("Consider first the conditions prevailing in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when non-folk music was performed almost exclusively
in salons of the wealthy and later in the concert halls and opera houses accessible only to the
privileged few. Enjoyment of music was a special occasion, something carefully planned in
advance, each performance a unique, fleeting event.").
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"Music appreciation has been radically altered by the technological
and social changes in the twentieth century."' °' Music continually finds
us through numerous musical mouthpieces and across multiple public
and private venues. °2 From the clock radio awaking us with music in the
morning to the classical music that sends us off to sleep in the evening,
music has come to be a permeating art form. Gone are the days where
sheet music and the radio were the primary vehicle for artists to "expose
their crafts."'0 3 Now, more so than ever before, there are numerous musi-
cal playing implements such as satellite radio stations, cds, cassettes,
music TV channels,' °4 television commercials,' 5 Internet radio and
streaming channels,' °6 and peer-to-peer computer networks, 0 7 all of
which are incredibly effective at bringing music to the masses. There are
numerous venues where music finds us, such as at work, in elevators,
doctor's offices, home, restaurants, shopping malls, sporting events, and
other social gatherings, to name just a few. Music, especially "popular"
music is simply "impossible to avoid ' 1s and has "pervaded every aspect
of modern life."' 9 In fact, "[m]usic is so freely available today that we
take it for granted and may underestimate its power.'" ° As one noted
University of California psychologist has observed, it is simply impossi-
ble to have an appreciation for how music effects individuals without
101. Konecni, infra note 11, at 498.
102. See Lepera and Maneulin, supra note 97, at 12 ( "[I]t is virtually inescapable in our
daily lives. We are bombarded with it, by radio and television broadcast, in supermarkets,
department stores, the dentist's office, and virtually everywhere else we may chance to wan-
der.").
103. See Lauren J. Katunich, Time to Quit Paying The Payola Piper: Why Music Industry
Abuse Demands a Complete system Overhaul, 22 Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 643, 655 (2002).
104. See Margaret Brown, Bringing Down A Giant: The Monopoly of Music Television?
5 VAND J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 63, 65 (2002) ("MTV is unique in that it not only provides a fo-
rum for music artists to have their songs displayed to the public, but it has a profound
influence on the tastes of the public in music, culture, and celebrity.").
105. See Nora Miles, Pop Goes The Commercial: The Evolution of The Relationship
Between Popular Music and Television Commercials, 5 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 121, 122
(2002) (noting the increase use of pop songs in commercial ads).
106. The music industry is a multi-billion dollar a year industry. According to the
RIAA's available statistics, the total value of the music business in 1999 was $14.3 billion. See
Jenny Toomey, The Future of Music, 10 TEX. INTELL. PRop. L.J. 221, 230 (2002).
107. Jennifer Norman, Staying Alive: Can The Music Industry Survive Peer-To-Peer, 26
COLUMBIA-VLA J.L. & ARTS 371, 373 (2003).
108. STORR, supra note 93, at 21.
109. Adam Fernandez, Let It Be: A Comparative Study of The Content Regulation of
Recorded Music in The United States And The United Kingdom, 21 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV.
227, 228 (2002).
110. STORR, supra note 93.
Musical Musings
first appreciating that there has been a "penetration of music into every
comer of people's lives, literally and metaphorically. ""'
Notwithstanding that music has steadily and increasingly invaded all
facets of our existence over the series of several decades (and nothing
suggests this infiltration has reached its zenith), music copyright law has
not at all altered its fundamental balance in the last 150 years. The stan-
dard for music copyright infringement is essentially the same today as
when Justice Nelson handed down the decision in Jollie.1
2
Music copyright holders have been given broad powers over their
copyrights, which has allowed holders to leverage significant financial
gains from these exclusivities. A byproduct of this enormous commer-
cial success is a culture infused with the music that has been foisted
upon it. Even though there has been a total musical inundation, music
copyright law expects that no one will respond to this music by using or
otherwise incorporating this music into new works. This is an unrealistic
expectation for at least two reasons.
First, music informs a culture, affects how individuals behave, and
necessarily motivates them to respond. Yet, for some reason, the archi-
tects of musical infusion have ostensibly been allowed to reap the
economic benefits that Congress and the courts have sewn by muzzling
the responses of those affected by the music. This is what one author has
referred to as the "copyright lockdown" which has the far-reaching im-
plications of controlling "innovations in the marketplace" of music
making."
3
Second, two famous music copyright cases have showcased that
"copying" portions of a given work can happen as a result of the subcon-
scious mind."4 With the degree of music infiltrating our daily lives,
musicians are going to be-at a bare minimum-subconsciously af-
fected. As Judge Learned Hand recognized long ago, "[e]verything
registers somewhere in our memories, and no one can tell what may
evoke it.""' Yet, our music copyright laws are set up to punish this sub-
conscious conduct, even though it is likely due, at least in some material
degree, to the process of musical inundation that was created by the
copyright holders to begin with.
111. Vladimir J. Konecni, Social Interaction and Musical Preference, in THE PSYCHOL-
OGY OF Music 499 (Diana Deutsch ed., 1982); see also BLOOM, supra note 99, at 68 ("Today,
a very large proportion of young people between the ages of ten and twenty live for music.").
112. See supra text accompanying notes 17-19
113. See Toomey, supra note 106, at 231-32.
114. See Bright Tunes Music v. Harrisongs Music, 420 . Supp. 177, 180-81 (S.D.N.Y.
1976) (George Harrison); Fred Fisher Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1924)
(Jerome Kern).
115. Fred Fisher, 298 F. at 147.
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The point here is not to rail against big corporations that have librar-
ies full of music copyrights. Rather, the thrust of this section is to
emphasize the prominence that music has attained in society, which is
due in no small part to the music copyright holders' diligent efforts at
peddling these musical works to the public. Music is disseminated
through a vast reservoir of media. Because of this, music bombards indi-
viduals on a systemic and daily basis. The law should anticipate and
expect that the responses to this incredible music infiltration will be var-
ied and abundant and it should encourage such responses.
C. Musical Borrowings
Finally, the world of music composition has historically enjoyed a
healthy diet of musical borrowings where one composer takes musical
material from another. Notwithstanding this history, our copyright laws
have been passed and interpreted as imposing liability even when rela-
tively small amounts of musical material have been taken from a work
protected under Title 17.16
There is no doubt that "[t]he artistic world has developed its own in-
formal rules for borrowing." 7 Nowhere is this more true than in the
world of music. "Musical stealing is as old as music itself."" 8 Indeed,
one does not need to scour the annals of music history very long to be
washed over by the glut of musical compositions whose specific melodic
origins can be traced back to pre-existing pieces of music. The history of
western music, in particular, demonstrates this phenomenon of musical
borrowing to prodigious proportions. Perhaps it was this prodigiousness
that caused one noted music copyright scholar to suggest that music was
likely not protected by copyright historically because of the notion that
music represented a "common heritage" shared by all peoples irrespec-
tive of their places in various social and economic strata." 9 Whether this
sentiment be accurate, there can be no question that musical borrowings
have existed in significant quantities dating back at least into the first
millennium.
For example, consider the earliest days of sacred Western Music.
"Gregorian Chant" is a genre of modal music emanating from, and
116. For example, one court opined that even a six-note melodic sequence could be the
basis of an infringement claim if the copied portion was "qualitatively important" to the plain-
tiff's work. See Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F2d 421, 425 (9th Cir. 1987) (John Williams).
117. Keyt, supra note 74,at 422.
118. See ALFRED M. SHAFTER, MUSICAL COPYRIGHT 187 (1932); E. DeMatt Henderson,
The Law of Copyright Especially Musical, 1 COPYRIGHT LAW SYMPOSIUM 125, 150 (1939).
119. SHAFTER, supra note 118, at 1.
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flourishing during, medieval times.' 20 Throughout the first millennia,
chant melodies spread throughout Europe and Asia and various regions
altered these melodies to suit there own particular tastes and interests.'
2'
Secular music of this time period also demonstrates the notion that the
folk music du jour was based on melodies borrowed by and between the
troubadours, the wandering minstrels that traveled from hamlet to hamlet
to perform musical works."'22
Other examples of musical borrowings abound in the world of music
that is commonly referred to as "classical music.' ' 23 For example, Handel
perpetually used pre-existing musical material to the point where books
were written concerning this "open and notorious thief."'' 24 Bach bor-
rowed material from Remken, Vivaldi, and Telemann. 25  Brahms
borrowed from Hayden and Beethoven.' 26 Beethoven borrowed from
Bach, and Mozart borrowed from DuPort. 127 Rachmaninoff borrowed
from Brahms, who in turn had borrowed from Liszt, who in turn had
borrowed from Paganini.'28 In fact, Brahms noted that "imitation" has
significant pedagogical benefits in that it "is the best way to understand
how music is written and structured." 29 The list of borrowings by the
masters from the masters and others is immense and faithfully repro-
duced elsewhere.
30
Musical snatchings are not just endemic to medieval and classical
music genres. The earliest days of American music are marked with nu-
merous instances where songwriters borrowed melodies and music from
pre-existing tunes to write new melodies. 3' During the colonial days,
ballad-operas used melodies which were "tunes then popular with the
120. See http://www.beaufort.demon.co.uk/chant.htm. Chant is a style of music used
during liturgical celebrations consisting of a single melodic line without accompaniment.
121. See http://www.beaufort.demon.co.uk/chant.htm.
122. Id.
123. Most people, when they refer to "classical music" mean just about any type of mu-
sic written from the late seventeenth century all the way into the twentieth century.
Technically, music written during this time frame is divided into four discreet categories, viz.,
Baroque Period from 1685-1750, Classical Period from 1750-1825; Romantic Period from
1825-1900; and 20th Century, 1900-Present.
124. Henderson, supra note 118, at 150; see also PERCY ROBINSON, HANDEL AND His
ORBIT (1908); SEDEY TAYLOR, THE INDEBTEDNESS OF HANDEL TO OTHER COMPOSERS (1908).
125. SHAFTER, supra note 118, at 187.
126. Id. at 188.
127. Henderson, supra note 118, at 150.
128. See http://www.paganini.com/nicolo/nicindex.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2004).
129. See http://members.aol.com/dmarkol/brahms/composition.htm (last visited Feb. 25,
2004).
130. See N. CARRELL, BACH THE BORROWER 227-365 (1967) (listing sources of some of
Bach's material); see also SHAFTER, supra note 118, at 188.
131. Take for example the music that came about in the 1600s in the Massachusetts Bay
settlement. There, music melodies were taken and set to new texts of the biblical psalms. See
SABLOSKY, supra note 61, at 6.
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public but adapted to new lyrics.' '3 2 African American spirituals were
adopted from "Irish and Scotch-Irish Hymnody."'33 As patriotic fervor
swept the Country in the 19th Century, it engendered a series of musical
compositions whose melodies were taken from pre-existing material.
The music of our very own national anthem, "The Star Spangled Ban-
ner", is actually the music to an old English song. 3 4 The nationalistic
number "America" is also a patriotic song owing its melody to a song
written on the other side of the Atlantic.'35 The music to "My Country
'tis of Thee" is the same as the music to "God Save the Queen,"'36 an
English anthem.
Even as the end of the 19th Century approached, musical borrowings
heavily dotted the musical landscape. Publications of African American
spiritual and cowboys songs in the late 1800s and early 1900s "opened
to composers a goldmine of nostalgic feelings and melodies that would
be exploited during the 1930s."'37 In the latter part of the 20th Century,
several American composers used pre-existing musical works to create
new musical compositions. Aaron Copeland and Virgil Thompson are
but two in a vast sea of composers.' 38 George Gershwin, film score writer
Miklos Rosza, and popular song composers Eric Carmen and Billy Joel
all used pre-existing material to create hit songs that were wildly popu-
lar.
139
Consider also the world of jazz music, a genre of music that is in-
digenous to America and that developed and flourished at the end of the
19th Century and continues with great significance today. One of the key
compositional techniques that has been used in jazz is "interpolation",
the process of borrowing pre-existing musical material and then impro-
vising on it to create a new musical work. Years ago, one author
poignantly captured the essence of this compositional technique:
In New Orleans, Jazz was a performing as well as a creative art.
Jazz musicians brought colorations to ragtime and the blues
never before realized on their instruments by others, and through
personal and unique methods of performance. These New
132. See EWEN, supra note 11, at 64.
133. VIRGIL THOMPSON, AMERICAN MUSIC SINCE 1910 4 (1970).
134. The Star Spangled Banner was written to the music of "To Anacreaon in Heaven"
and "America" was written to the tune of "God Save the King." See Henderson, supra note
118, at 133.
135. Id.
136. STORR, supra note 93, at 22.
137. THOMPSON, supra note 133, at 3.
138. Id. at 56.
139. Eric Carmen borrowed music written by Rachmaninoff to write his hit singles "All
By Myself' and "Never Gonna Fall In Love Again." Billy Joel's chorus to "This Night" is
taken directly from Beethoven's Pathetique Piano Sonata.
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Orleans musicians further opened new horizons for their music
through their fabled gift of improvisation. One man would
provocatively throw out an idea; it would be seized and
embellished by another. The two would join forces, each
proceeding in his own direction without losing sight of the other
... Improvisation, then, became not only an art for the solo
instrument, but for combinations of instruments, in which
different rhythms were daringly combined, conflicting tonalities
assembled, dissonant sounds blended... The musical imagination
would be given full freedom of movement."
Jazz musicians have always borrowed the music from "Bach to
Schonberg" to create this "third stream music.' '' 41 It is precisely this "full
freedom of movement"'42 that has allowed the jazz art form to flourish
and thrive.
Consider further the current technological realities that have ushered
in the relatively new phenomenon of music sampling, the practice of
manipulating existing sound recordings and extracting from them short
musical interludes and snippets.4 4 This technological reality has lead to
significant amounts of infringement suits and legions of law review arti-
cles.'" These sampling wars and scholarly ruminations aptly underscore
the ineffective nature of music copyright laws to fully address and be
sensitive to the social realities of music making as brought about by
technological innovations.
Whether considering the plain chant melodies of medieval times, the
complex contrapuntal works of J.S. Bach, or the popular musical works
of 20th Century composers and musicians, music borrowing has been an
historical practice that has been part of numerous compositional palettes
and is actually woven into the psyche of the composer's existence. 4 1 Yet,
140. EWEN, supra note 11, at 147.
141. SABLOSKY, supra note 61, at 174-75; see also, THOMPSON, supra note 133, at 5
("Jazz is instrumental-a communal improvisation in four four time on some popular tune-
usually a commercial one which the players have no qualms about turning inside out.")
142. EWEN, supra note 11, at 147.
143. See Henry Self, Digital Sampling: A Cultural Perspective, 9 UCLA ENT. L. REV.
347 (2002).
144. The enormous loads of journal articles written on digital sampling caused one au-
thor to quip that "the legality of digital sampling and its implications has been perhaps the
student author's favorite dead horse." See Matthew Africa, The Misuse of Licensing Evidence
in Fair Use Analysis: New Technologies, New Markets, and The Courts, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1145
n.121 (2000).
145. P. GRIFFITHS, MODERN Music: THE AVANT GARDE SINCE 1945 200 (1981) ("[T]he
more significant reasons for such borrowings have been those of an aesthetic or even moral
order: the need to test the present against the past and vice versa, the desire to improve contact
with audiences by offering known subjects for discussion, the wish to find musical analogues
for the multiple and simultaneous sensory bombardment in the world.").
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our copyright laws have wholly discounted this historical practice and
have, in fact, exacted penalties for the meager use of musical material
from a pre-existing work. 46 Not only has this legal regime overlooked
this historical practice, it has cooled expressive musical activity in the
process.
D. Recapitulation
In short, somewhere along the line, the law of music copyright for-
got to check in with the world of music. Music copyright law has been
largely about shielding economic interests of those within the music
making industry, while others such as the musicians and the rank-and-
file members of society, have been largely left out of the music copyright
equation. 4 7 But "[m]usic is a creative force and a rigorous art' ' 48 and,
consequently, "our legal thinking should also be imaginative and rigor-
ous.' 4 9 While untold efforts have been invested in creating the laws
pertaining to music copyright over the years, these efforts have over-
looked important social realities about the nature of music, its ever-
increasing ubiquity in society, and the history of the musical composi-
tion process. When these unique attributes and realities are explored,
they suggest that music copyright law needs to be reconsidered and
shifted from its present static, copyright-holder-take-all state to a fluid
paradigm that more faithfully acknowledges pluralistic interests of oth-
ers outside the small confines of the music industry and the broader
social norms and realities that inform our culture. Part III of this Article
proffers such an alternative construct.
III. OF COURTROOMS AND COPYRIGHTS
In addition to the policy shortcomings inherent in the current music
copyright protection regime, there are three significant practical hurdles
that consistently and systematically appear when music copyright claims
wind their ways into federal courthouses. First, the "reasonable listener"
model inherited is an ill-suited legal construct that simply is out of place
in the context of music copyright infringement analysis. Second, the
146. See, e.g., Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (eight note
musical ostinato held to be an infringement); Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421, 425 (9th Cir.
1987) (taking six note sequence could be infringement if "qualitatively important" to Plain-
tiff's work).
147. See Toomey, supra note 106, at 225 (explaining how "citizens and creators" have
been left out of the debate between Congress and the music industry).
148. Desmond Manderson & David Caudill, Modes of Law: Music and Legal Theory, An
Interdisciplinary Workshop Introduction, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 1325, 1328 (1999).
149. Id.
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overabundant (and almost exclusive) reliance on the opinions of music
experts has turned music copyright litigation into a "battle of the ex-
perts" forum. While musicologists can certainly add valuable testimony
at trial, they have been allowed to testify far beyond their respective
fields of expertise, which necessarily distorts the judicial process.' °
Third, the current legal test of "substantial similarity" overlooks some of
the inherent problems that are possessed by jurors, viz., the inability to
perceive and process musical sounds. When all three of these deficien-
cies are examined, they suggest that a recalibrated legal test for music
copyright infringement should be considered.
A. The Reasonable Listener Model
Ever since Porter forged the current legal framework for determining
music copyright infringement in a given case, courts have deployed
some variation of the "reasonable person" model as the ultimate arbiter
as to whether music copyright infringement takes place.' Accordingly,
the ultimate issue that is to be decided is whether a reasonable listener
would find that the two pieces of music at issue are the same.5 2 This test
is not centered on what the individuals in the jury box or on the bench
subjectively think; rather, the trier of fact is asked "to suppress [its] own
perception[] and to listen as [it] supposes someone else might."'
153
The historical and philosophical underpinnings of the "reasonable
person" model illustrate that this construct is a fish out of the common
law waters that has been blindly cast into the music copyright infringe-
ment sea. As Professor Corbin stated years ago, the philosophical
justification for the reasonable person in the realm of legal analysis is
that the "law of contract as in the law of tort, men are expected to live up
150. See Michael D. Manuelian, The Role of The Expert Witness in Music Copyright
Litigation, 57 FORDHAM L. REv. 127, 128 (1988) ("Both parties usually come armed with
experts, and the ensuing battle often constitutes a significant segment of a music infringement
trial.").
151. See, e.g., Dawson v. Hinshaw Music Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 736 (4th Cir. 1990) (apply-
ing an intended audience test). The influence of the Porter test has "rippled far beyond the
music context" and is now used in a variety of copyright infringement analyses. See Alice J.
Kim, Expert Testimony And Substantial Similarity: Facing the Music in (Music) Copyright
Infringement Cases, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 109, 112 (1995).
152. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 E2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946) ("The question, therefore, is
whether defendant took from plaintiff's works so much of what is pleasing to the ears of lay
listeners, who comprise the audience for whom such popular music is composed, that defen-
dant wrongfully appropriated something which belongs to the plaintiff.").
153. See Reynolds M. Fletcher, Music Analysis For Expert Testimony in Music Copy-
right Infringement Litigation 477 (1991) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Kansas) (on file with University of Kansas and author).
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to the standard of the reasonably prudent man.' '5 4 Other scholars have
echoed that this "reasonable person" is a vehicle for assessing social
norms and whether the litigants in a given case have fallen below that
minimum threshold. For example, the reasonable person formulation is a
model that provides meanings to "status and roles within a given social
order."'55 Another has noted that "[t]he reasonable person standard is an
empty vessel that jurors fill with community norms."' 56 All of these sen-
timents underscore one salient truism about the reasonable person
standard: it has utility as a legal mechanism because it is used as the
prism through which conduct is viewed. In other words, the jurispruden-
tial fiction of the reasonable person exists for the purpose of assessing
the conduct of a given set of parties and then applying legal maxims or
precepts accordingly. The need to be able to assess conduct and arrive at
resulting legal conclusions is obvious. Because we live in a society our
actions must necessarily be judged against some criteria if we are to ex-
perience the tranquil administration of justice. Thus, the justification for
this "all-knowing arbiter of reasonableness" is a social and legal neces-
sity and presupposes that there is a "right way" and a "wrong way" for
us to carry out our affairs in society. "'
The overriding problem with the reasonable listener model in the
context of music copyright litigation is that this reasonable listener is not
being called upon to gauge conduct of parties to the litigation; rather, the
standard is being used to determine how a reasonable listener would
aurally perceive a given piece Of music.' However, there is no accepted
"social norm" that would provide any meaningful standard on how a
piece of music would be perceived by a "reasonable listener." In fact,
music perception is an inherently subjective process that differs from
individual to individual. 9 "The same sound that magically empowers
one person can scare another nearly to death." '6° A piece of music may
be perceived differently by two individuals, but that does not mean that
one perception is "right" and one is "wrong." Yet, the "reasonable
154. Arther L. Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, and Some of the Resulting Legal Relations,
265 YALE L.J. 169, 205 (1917).
155. MICHAEL SALTMAN, THE DEMISE OF THE REASONABLE MAN 21 (1991).
156. See Steven Hetcher, Non-Utilitarian Negligence Norms And The Reasonable Person
Standard, 54 VAND. L. REv. 863, 864 (2001).
157. See Larry A. Dimatteo, The Counterpoise of Contracts: The Reasonable Person
Standard and The Subjectivity of Judgment, 48 S.C. L. REV. 293, 294 (1997).
158. See, e.g., Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1987).
159. See Fletcher, supra notes 153 (opining that music perception is really an aesthetic
determination); see also CAMPBELL, supra note 81, at 38-39, 45 (observing that diet, envi-
ronment, day-to-day health, and climate all effect the process of how sound is heard and
processed).
160. CAMPBELL, supra note 81, at 43.
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listener" standard presupposes that there is a "right and a wrong way" to
hear a piece of music. This simply is not the case.16' Thus, the trier of
fact is "not equipped" to make the determination that is being asked of
it.
62
Baxter v. MCA163 illustrates the point that music perception cannot
accurately be objectified, at least with any accuracy, through deployment
of a reasonable listener standard. In Baxter, the renowned film music
composer John Williams was accused of copyright infringement. The
allegedly-infringing work was Williams' "Theme from E.T.", which had
garnered Williams much praise and a Grammy in 1982.' 64 An old ac-
quaintance of Williams', Leslie Baxter, claimed that the Theme from
E.T. was taken from Baxter's 1953 composition entitled "Joy." Williams
moved for summary judgment and conceded that he had access to the
work, but claimed there was no substantial similarity and that reasonable
minds could not differ on this point. In granting summary judgment to
Williams, the trial court observed that:
This court's "ear" is as lay as they come. The court cannot hear
any substantial similarity between defendant's expression of the
idea and plaintiff's. Until Professor Bacal's tapes were listened
to, the Court could not even tell what the complaint was about.
Granted that Professor Bacal's comparison exposes a musical
similarity in sequence of notes which would, perhaps, be obvi-
ous to experts, the similarity of expression (or impression as a
whole) is totally lacking and could not be submitted to a jury.65
The grant of summary judgment was reversed by the 9th Circuit. In
reversing, the court claimed that its "ears" were no more "sophisticated
than those of the district court."' 66 Nevertheless, the court believed that
"reasonable minds could differ as to whether Joy and Theme from E.T.
are substantially similar.'
67
161. There are no "bright lines" when "comparing musical works," instead, there is "a
spectrum of similarity and difference." Keyt, supra note 74, at 443; see also, KAPLAN, supra
note 16, at 53 (noting that various aspects of a given piece of music "may influence [the] per-
ception" of the individual).
162. Michael Sitzer, Copyright Infringement Actions: The Proper Role for Audience
Reactions in Determinating Substantial Similarity, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 385, 390 (1981).
163. 812 E2d 421 (9th Cir. 1987).
164. http://www.johnwilliams.org/reference/grammyawards.html (last visited Feb. 25,
2004).
165. See Baxter, 812 F.2d at 423.
166. Id. at 424.
167. Id.
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Baxter illustrates the intrinsic problems with attempting to fit an in-
herently subjective inquiry into an objective mold: it cannot be done
based on any collective judgment or sense of what is right and wrong.
Because the use of the reasonable listener necessarily presupposes
that there is a right and a wrong way to perceive a given piece of music,
this legal fiction is ill-suited for the task at hand.
B. Expert Testimony
Music copyright claimants would be significantly hobbled by at-
tempting to joust over whether a given piece of music is substantially
similar without the aid of expert testimony.'68 As such, it would be diffi-
cult to overstate the importance of experts in music copyright
litigation. 69 Experts provide layers of testimony that not only help edu-
cate the jury on the particularities and peculiarities of music, but also on
how these experts believe the music in question would be perceived by a
"reasonable listener." Thus, the expert takes on at least two different
roles in music copyright litigation, both of which are inextricably inter-
twined with the Plaintiffs' burden of proof.
First, the expert helps establish that "objective" copying occurred.
As Porter noted, "[o]n this issue, analysis ('dissection') is relevant, and
the testimony of experts may be received to aid the trier of the facts.' '7 °
Typically, the expert dissection involves the expert's preparation of "vis-
ual exhibits of portions of the sheet music of both songs in order to show
similar 'grouping of notes, similarity of bars, accent, harmony, or mel-
ody.' ,,171 With analysis in hand, the expert seeks to convince the fact
finder that there are "objective similarities" between the two works. 72 If
the copyright owner's expert fails in convincing the trier of fact that there
168. See Manuelian, supra note 150, at 127.
169. Indeed one musicologist and attorney has indicated that in Selle v. Gibb, 741 E2d
896 (7th Cir. 1984), the plaintiff's expert's imprecision lead to the trial judge granting the
defendant's motion notwithstanding the jury's verdict. See M. Fletcher Reynolds, Selle v. Gibb
and the Forensic Analyst of Music Plagiarism (1993), at http://www.musicanalyst.com/
selle-vgibb.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2004) (noting that the plaintiff's expert "seemed to be
using the term 'striking similarity' loosely and would not state unequivocally that the similari-
ties could result only from copying," which meant that "[w]ithout expert testimony on this
point, plaintiff could not meet his burden of proof").
170. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
171. See Daus, supra note 75, at 618 (citing Hirsch v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 17
F.Supp. 816, 818 (S.D. Cal. 1937)).
172. The defense experts seek to refute this evidence by arguing there are no objective
similarities, or that any evidence of objective copying is a result of independent creation or
coincidence. See M. Fletcher, supra note 153.
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are objective similarities between the two pieces in question, there can
be no finding of infringement.
17 3
Second, once the expert assists in establishing "objective similari-
ties," the expert can help establish that these objective similarities
constitute "illicit appropriation." As noted above, the ultimate touchstone
for determining whether there has been an illicit appropriation is based
on "whether defendant took from plaintiff's works so much of what is
pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, who comprise the audience for
whom such popular music is composed, that defendant wrongfully ap-
propriated something which belongs to the plaintiff."'74 In this regard,
"expert testimony of musicians may also be received, but ... should be
utilized only to assist in determining the reactions of lay auditors."'7 5
Thus, the net effect of the Porter standard is that experts are allowed to
testify as to how they believe a reasonable lay listener would hear a
given piece of music.
There are significant procedural and logistical drawbacks to allow-
ing experts to testify as to how they subjectively believe a lay, reasonable
listener would hear a piece of music. This entire inquiry presupposes that
there actually is an objective standard through which music perception
can be gauged and arrived at with any degree of accuracy. As music per-
ception is a subjective process, there simply is no quintessential or
objective way to perceive a piece of music.
1 6
Moreover, allowing expert testimony in this regard arguably collides
with the Federal Rules of Evidence and the seminal Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals77 decision, which redirected the federal judici-
ary's stance on admissibility of expert testimony. 78 In Daubert, the Court
held that the Federal Rules of Evidence impose a special obligation upon
a trial judge to "ensure that any and all scientific testimony ... is not
only relevant, but reliable."'179 Expert testimony is admissible if it is
173. See, e.g., Selle, 741 F.2d at 901 ("Proof of copying is crucial to any claim of copy-
right infringement because no matter how similar the two works may be (even to the point of
identity), if the defendant did not copy the accused work, there is no infringement.").
174. Porter, 154 F.2d at 473.
175. Id. at 473.
176. "There is perhaps no art so subject to every man's judgment as music." JOHANN
HOACHIM QUANTZ, VERSUCH EINER ANWEISUNG DIE FLOTE TRAVERSIERE ZU SPEILEN
(1752), in Source Readings in Music History (1950).
177. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
178. See Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999); see also Arte-
mio Rivera, Testing The Admissibility of Trademark Surveys After Daubert, 84 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 661, 662 (2002) ("Daubert created a doctrinal change in the law of
evidence by moving the focus of the admissibility inquiry from the general acceptability test
to a test of reliability and relevance.").
179. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 (emphasis added).
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based on "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge."'
80
"Knowledge" is the "sum of the principles and facts generally accepted
as well grounded within a given field, and not just "'subjective belief or
unsupported speculation.' """' Clearly, an expert's testimony as to objec-
tive similarities between two pieces of music squares with this
definition. The expert's opinion as to how a lay, reasonable listener
might hear a given piece of music is more tenuous."2 This is precisely
the type of subjective opinion masquerading as "expert testimony" that
Daubert sought to eradicate.'83
Even if it could be established that music perception could be accu-
rately objectified, and even if expert testimony as to illicit appropriation
could satisfy the Daubert test, it still seems questionable as to whether
an expert musicologist would be the appropriately-credentialed person to
testify as to how music is perceived by a lay listener.' 8 Having a musi-
cally-learned individual testify as to how a reasonable lay listener might
hear a piece of music is akin to asking a trained scientist to testify as to
how a reasonable individual might interpret a scientific formula. It seems
questionable that either expert could divorce themselves from the years
of training and somehow labor under the confines of a less experienced
and a less initiated intellect.'85
C. Tone Deafness
The final problem with the current test for music copyright in-
fringement is its reliance on the fact finder's aural abilities when, in fact,
those abilities may be lacking or seriously deficient. 1 6 Tone deafness or
180. FED R. EvID. 702.
181. See Rivera, supra note 178, at 666.
182. See FED. R. EvID. 702 Advisory Committee Notes, 2000 Amendment ( "Daubert set
forth a non-exclusive checklist for trial court to use in assessing the reliability of scientific
expert testimony. The specific factors explicated by the Daubert Court are (1) whether the
expert's technique or theory can be challenged in some objective sense, or whether it is instead
simply a subjective, conclusory approach that cannot reasonably be assessed for reliability.");
see also Goebel v. Denver and Rio Grande Western R. Co., 346 F.3d 987, 991 (10th Cir. 2003)
("[A]n inference or assertion must be derived by the scientific method... [and] must be sup-
ported by appropriate validation-i.e. 'good grounds,' based on what is known.").
183. Glastetter v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 252 E3d 986, 989 (8th Cir. 2001) ("[Dlistrict
court's gate keeping role separates expert opinion evidence based on 'good grounds' from
subjective speculation that masquerades as scientific knowledge.").
184. See Manuelian, supra note 150, at 133 ("[W]hether an expert highly educated in the
field of music theory, analysis, and history can in fact hear again as lay listener is speculative
at best.").
185. See Maureen Baker, A Note to Follow So: Have We Forgotten The Federal Rules of
Evidence in Music Plagiarism Cases?, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1583, 1589 (1992) (claiming that
music expert testimony distorts the process of finding infringement).
186. Arnstein v. Porter 154 F2d 464, 473 n.22 (2d Cir. 1946) ("[I]t would, accordingly,
be proper to exclude tone-deaf persons from the jury.").
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"amusia" is the broad clinical term referring to a spectrum of maladies
effecting the brain and its ability to process music.187 Specifically, tone
deafness effects an individual's ability to perceive, produce, or remember
musical sounds. 8' Although amusia can be caused by traumas to the
brain, "'89 it can also exist in those that have never experienced a head in-
jury of any sort. In fact, recent studies are suggesting that it is an
inherited trait passed down from preceding generations.' 90 "Tone deaf-
ness is an evolving and expanding issue" and speech and hearing
therapists are discovering that it is a more common deficiency than pre-
viously believed.' 9' In fact, recent studies have suggested that as many as
one in four adults have problems in "recognizing tunes" and that one in
twenty have "severe tone deafness."' 92
Although it was recognized years ago by Porter that excluding "tone
deaf' individuals would be appropriate in music copyright infringement
cases, this rule of exclusion could potentially eliminate twenty-five per-
cent of all prospective jurors and jurists of today. Empanelling a jury for
a given case can be a Herculean task in and of itself. It has been esti-
mated that "as many as two-thirds of the approximately 15 million
Americans summoned to jury service each year fail to report for jury
duty." 93 But even those that appear "strive to get out of jury duty once
they enter the courthouse."'94 Thus, lopping off an additional twenty-five
percent of the pool is not going to make the process of empanelling a
jury any easier.
Moreover, even if excluding tone deaf individuals would not deplete
such a large portion of prospective jurors from consideration, the process
of voir dire on this issue could get complicated and more complex as
every potential juror would need to be examined for musical sound proc-
essing aptitude. For bench trials, the prospect of tone deafness testing
187. See Oscar S. M. Martin, Neurological Aspects of Music Perception and Perform-
ance, in PSYCHOLOGY OF Music, supra note 10, at 454.
188. See Christopher Frazier, Tone Deafness (2002), at http://hubel.sfasu.edu/courseinfo/
SL02/tone-deafness.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2004).
189. Martin, supra note 187, at 454.
190. Born to be Tone Deaf? Searching For The Cause of Musical Dysfunction (NPR
Radio Broadcast, January 16, 2002), available at http://www.npr.org/programs/atc/features/
2002/jan/tonedeaf/020116.tonedeaf.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2004).
191. See Frazier, supra note 188.
192. See http://notes.utk.edu/bio/greenberg.nsf/e972592203c877ef8525676b005ded2d/
86675dbb4051040b852569d400613054?OpenDocument (last visited Feb. 25, 2004); see also
Daniel J. Levitin, Ph.D., Tone Deafness: Failures of Musical Anticipation and Self-Reference,
4 INT'L J. OF COMPUTING AND ANTICIPATORY SYSTEMS 243 (1999), available at http://
ego.psych.mcgill.ca/levitin.html/pubspageslID casys.htnml.
193. See David Schneider, Jury Deliberations and the Need for Jury Reform: An Out-
sider's View, 36 JUDGES' J. 23 (Fall 1997).
194. See Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, Five Ways The Kentucky Legislature Can
Improve Jury Service, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 1, 11 (2003).
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becomes even more sensitive as the litigants face the uncomfortable task
of screening the ears of the judge that has been assigned to the case.
D. Finale
In conclusion, there are significant drawbacks to the current legal
standard for determining whether a given piece of music can be said to
infringe on the copyright of another piece. The current standard is predi-
cated on the faulty premise that there is a single "reasonable" way to
perceive a piece of music. Additionally, the liberal deployment of ex-
perts to guide the jury has, to a large extent, exacerbated the problem.
Finally, setting up the legal standard so that the jury is required to make
its infringement assessment based solely on its subjective perception is
problematic because as many as twenty-five percent of the jurors may be
physically unable to make such an assessment. These shortcomings of
the legal test for infringement can be significantly ameliorated as pro-
vided in the following section.
IV. A NEW VARIATION ON A THEME
Music copyright is broken and we should, therefore, reconsider the
current framework built by Congress and interpreted by the courts. By its
very nature, music copyright law does not take into account social, tech-
nological, and historical realities that have formed and shaped the world
of music and the creative process attendant thereto. Instead, the law has
proceeded along an economically-guided path that-while adding to the
coffers of the music industry power brokers-has not adequately ad-
dressed the complex and myriad issues and concerns of our pluralistic
society.' 95 Moreover, the actual legal test for music copyright infringe-
ment is not sensitive to the underlying realities as to how music is and
can be perceived in different ways by different individuals. Thus, the
overarching policy and the application of the legal standard combine to
created a flawed music copyright protection regime. But there are poten-
tial solutions with many possible benefits. Those suggested solutions are
discussed here.
195. LITMAN, supra note 72, at 36 ("A century ago, Congress confronted the dilemma of
updating and simplifying a body of law that seemed too complicated and arcane for legislative
revision. To solve that problem, Congress and the Copyright Office settled on a scheme for
statutory drafting that featured meetings and negotiations among representatives of industries
with interests in copyright.").
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A. Music Use Compulsory License
Instead of having a copyright system that wholly restricts use of pre-
existing musical material protected by copyright, we should have a sys-
tem that encourages or allows this practice so long as the music borrower
pays a fee for its use. 96 The legal contours of such a system could be
similar to the phonorecords compulsory license provision already em-
bedded in the Copyright Act.197 This proposed "musical use compulsory
license" could be obtained by anyone so long as notice was given to the
copyright owner and the statutorily established fee was paid by the bor-
rower. The fee for such a compulsory borrowing could be based on two
elements: (1) the amount of music borrowed, and (2) the number of
phonorecords produced by the borrower. Thus, if an enterprising young
musician wanted to borrow 10 seconds of a Jimi Hendrix guitar solo in
the process of creating a new musical work, the young musician is wel-
come to do so, as long as the fee is paid to the copyright holder pursuant
to the statutory rate.
The benefits of such a system are numerous and represent a multilat-
eral win for all involved. First, such a system would expressly take into
account the complexities and realities of the current social tide of musi-
cal infusion. Second, this compulsory fee would be more sensitive to the
underlying historical practices that have been part of the musical compo-
sition tradition for centuries."' Third, the availability of this license
would help stem the swelling tide of music copyright infringement
196. One scholar suggests that a compulsory license fee would make sense in the music
context if the use by the second composer were outside the market of the first composer. See
Keyt, supra note 74, at 459.
197. See 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1) (2002). "When phonorecords of a nondramatic musical
work have been distributed to the public in the United States under the authority of the copy-
right owner, any other person, including those who make phonorecords or digital phonorecord
deliveries, may, by complying with the provisions of this section, obtain a compulsory license
to make and distribute phonorecords of the work." Id.
198. See supra Part III.C. Moreover, allowing this practice of musical borrowing would
bring the U.S. in line with several other countries that have already acknowledged the utility
of allowing small amounts of copyrighted works to be used for inclusion into new works. See,
e.g., Austria, Urheberrechtsgesetz [UrhG] § 5(2) ("The use of a work in creating another work
shall not make the latter an adaptation, provided it constitutes an independent new work as
compared to the work used"); UrhG § 52(1) (permitting use of single passages of a published
musical work in an independent new musical work); Brazil, C6digo Civil, lei n. 5.988 of Dec.
14, 1973, art. 50 ("Pastiches and parodies shall be lawful in so far as they are not real repro-
ductions of the work on which they are based and do not discredit it'"); Bulgaria, Zakon za
avtorskoto pravo, Nov. 16, 1951, § 6 ("[N]either consent of author nor payment to him re-
quired for use of work in the creation of a new, independent work, except for literary-dramatic
adaptations."); Zakon za avtorskoto pravo, Nov. 16, 1951, § 7(b) ("[C]omposers can use liter-
ary texts without author's consent, but must pay author a fee upon publication'") (all
aforementioned statutes are translated in UNESCO, COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE
WORLD (1984)).
Spring 2004]
440 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 10:407
cases. The economic motivations of the borrowing composer would
likely gravitate toward paying the compulsory fee as opposed to facing a
potential lengthy and costly court battle. This would, in turn, help relieve
pressure on the federal judiciary as music copyright infringement suits
would be less prevalent.
Undoubtedly there will be those that would decry the above proposal
as too extreme and a serious erosion and affront to music copyright
holders everywhere.' 99 However, there are several poignant examples as
to how relaxing copyright controls can lead to increased artistic output.
20
Moreover, under this proposed compulsory license formulation, the
composer or musician from whom material is borrowed would still re-
ceive a financial benefit. If this borrowing results in piece of music that
attains commercial success for the borrower, then the composer from
whom the material was borrowed would likewise share in that banquet in
a proportionate manner. Therefore, it would be hard to argue that the
compulsory license would disincentivize the copyright holder from
whom music is being borrowed.
In an ideal world, if a composer always sought this compulsory li-
cense before borrowing musical material from a pre-existing piece, the
need for a legal test for music copyright infringement would disappear.
There will always be those, however, that for one reason or another
forego the requirement of securing a compulsory license or paying the
necessary fee or are otherwise accused of wrong doing by taking some-
one else's musical material. It is for those individuals and for those
instances that the following proposal is suggested.
B. Intended Audience Test
Music is not composed in a vacuum,20' and it certainly is not com-
posed for the ears of a hypothetical reasonable listener. Whether the
music be a banal, largely incoherent popular song or a lyrical, program-
matic piece in the classical music genre, it was ultimately intended to be
heard by some audience that probably can be identified with a significant
199. Richard Parsons, the President of Time-Warner in 2000 stated that "[tlhis is a very
profound moment historically. This isn't about a bunch of kids stealing music. It's about an
assault on everything that constitutes the cultural expression of or society. If we fail to protect
and preserve our intellectual property system, the culture will atrophy. And corporations won't
be the only ones hurt. Artists will have no incentive to create. Worst-case scenario: The county
will end up in a sort of cultural Dark Ages." Quoted in Chuck Phillips, Music Industry Giants
Miss a Beat on the Web, L.A. TmEs, July 17, 2000, at Al.
200. See Keyes, supra note 98, at 115-16.
201. See Faith D. Kasparian, The Constitutionality of Teaching and Performing Sacred
Choral Music in Public Schools, 46 DUKE L.J. 1111, 1153 (1997) ("Music never exists in a
vacuum; it is always the product of a variety of forces-historical, political, literary, or reli-
gious-affecting the composer.").
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degree of precision.2°' Thus, does it make sense for music copyright in-
fringement to turn on the ultimate reaction of a hypothetical listener
whose auditory predilections are not at all clear or even objectively de-
fined? The answer is no.
Instead, music copyright infringement should be gauged by deter-
mining whether a "substantial" or an "appreciable" number of
individuals that listen to the type of music in question would find illicit
copying to have occurred." In other words, the fact finder would no
longer be asked to opine as to how some mythical person might hear the
music at issue; rather, the fact finder would be asked to assess the simi-
larities using actual responses of actual people. This is essentially the
same legal standard used in trademark cases, and its application in the
music copyright context makes sense for several reasons.
First, music-much like a trademark or a piece of advertising-is
targeted at a specific market segment 4.2M Thus, calibrating the inquiry to
focus on the reactions of those in that market would provide a stronger
indication as to whether a piece of music can be said to be borrowing
from another piece. Second, music-much like a trademark or a piece of
advertising-will be perceived differently depending on who is doing the
listening within that market. Thus, scrapping the observations of a "hy-
pothetical" listener and supplanting it with the actual responses from a
broad spectrum of listeners will be more sensitive to these auditory reali-
ties. Third, this "intended audience" test would not only square with the
reality that music is intended to be listened to by a particular set of indi-
viduals, but also is aligned with a significant amount of scholarship and
recent judicial pronouncements on the issue.05
In determining whether a "substantial" or "appreciable" number of
listeners would find illicit appropriation, once again trademark law can
202. See Paul M. Grinvalsky, Idea-Expression in Musical Analysis and The Role of The
Intended Audience in Music Copyright Infringement, 28 CAL. W. L. REV. 395, 427 (1992)
(suggesting that record companies and radio stations have been able to successfully identify
markets for different types of musical genres).
203. See Dawson v. Hinshaw Music Inc. 905 F.2d 731, 734 (4th Cir. 1990) ("In light of
the copyright law's purpose of protecting a creator's market, we think it sensible to embrace
Porter's command that the ultimate comparison of the works at issue be oriented towards the
works' intended audience.").
204. See Fletcher, supra note 153, at 477 (noting that the evidentiary problems faced in
music copyright litigation "more nearly approximate those of trademark law, which judges
similarities according to 'likelihood of confusion' ").
205. See, e.g., DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[E], at 13-62.4 n.202
(1989) ("If the works in issue are directed to a particular audience, then the 'spontaneous and
immediate' reaction of that audience is determinative."); Steven G. McNight, Substantial Simi-
larity Between Video Games: An Old Copyright Problem in a New Medium, 36 VAND. L. REV.
1277, 1290 n.91 (1983); Anthony L. Clapes et al., Silicon Epics and Binary Bards: Determin-
ing the Proper Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, 34 UCLA. L. REV.
1493, 1571 (1986-87); Dawson, 905 F.2d at 736.
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be of assistance. As Professor McCarthy has acknowledged, "in cases of
trademark infringement, unfair competition, and false advertising, the
subjective mental associations and reactions of prospective purchasers
are often an issue."2 6 Although impressions of the trier of fact and a rec-
ognized expert may shed some light on the ultimate inquiry, "a more
scientific means of evidencing mental association is to introduce the ac-
tual responses of a group of people who are typical of the target group
whose perceptions are at issue.207 Similarly, in cases of music copyright
infringement, the "reactions" of listeners is at the heart of the inquiry as
to whether there is an infringement.208 Because surveys "create an ex-
perimental environment from which to make informed inferences," they
could be used by the trier of fact in music copyright infringement actions
to make the ultimate determination of illicit copying.
The use of surveys in music copyright cases could also be deployed
without substantial practical drawbacks. There is a large body of litera-
ture on the use of surveys in litigation, 29 and the federal judiciary has set
forth recommendations as to how a survey should be conducted to en-
sure trustworthiness.2'° Thus, there would be significant guidance for the
music copyright litigator. Moreover, the use of surveys in this context
would arguably be less complicated than in the realms of trademark, un-
fair competition, and unfair advertising litigation.
In those realms, there are different types of surveys that need to be
conducted depending on the claims and causes of action at issue in a
given case."' In cases involving dilution, "[t]here is no standard criteria
,,212for surveying. Often times in the trademark arena, surveys are
challenged because of an alleged failure to survey the correct "universe"
of people.2 1 "Word choice" and imprecision in considering the exact
206. 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 32:158 (2003); see also Richard J. Leighton, Using (And Not Using) The Hearsay Rules to
Admit and Exclude Surveys in Lanham Act False Advertising and Trademark Cases, 92
TRADEMARK REP. 1305 (1992) ("Expert testimony in the form of surveys and related opinion
is routinely proffered in Lanham Act cases to prove how advertisements or trademarks influ-
ence perceptions.").
207. MCCARTHY, supra note 206, at § 32:158.
208. See NIMMER, supra note 205, at § 13.03.
209. See MCCARTHY, supra note 206, at § 32.58 (exhaustive list cited there).
210. See REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 264-65 (Federal Judicial Cen-
ter 1994). The manual suggests nine points be included in the survey report.
211. See William G. Barber, How To Do a Trademark Dilution Survey (Or Perhaps How
Not To Do One), 89 TRADEMARK REP. 616, 617 (1999) (noting that surveys and standard
methodology has been developed and differs for assessing the "likelihood of confusion" be-
tween two marks, whether a mark has "secondary meaning", and whether a mark is
"generic").
212. See Hershey Foods Corp. v. Mars, Inc., 998 F Supp. 500, 518 (M.D. Pa 1998).
213. See, e.g., Gillette Co. v. Norelco Consumer Prods. Co., 69 F Supp. 2d 246, 261 (D.
Mass. 1999) ("Another flaw in the Razor Commercial Study is that the universe of consumers
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contours of the commercial dispute at issue can often cause a survey to
fail . In the music copyright infringement realm, these problems would
not be as acute. The identification of the relevant universe of listeners
could probably be defined with a significant degree of precision in music
copyright cases.2 5 Because the music industry has more or less
established certain pre-defined markets for different types of music,
vetting potential survey candidates would not be overly onerous and time
consuming. Moreover, the complexities of the issues in other types of
litigation often leads to complexities in surveys, which inherently makes
the survey more subject to challenge by both opposing counsel and the
court. In the music copyright case, though, the inquiry would always be
the same, and a streamlined and coherent body of music copyright
survey case law could likely be developed in relative short order.
CONCLUSION
It is time to reconsider whether the current copyright law pertaining
to music still makes sense in light of the social, technological, and his-
torical realities of the world of music. Because music plays a far more
prominent role in shaping society now than at any other time in this
country's history, it simply is no longer necessary nor practical for copy-
right holders to lock down their copyrights in the same way that they
have been able to for decades. Instead, we should consider a compulsory
license system that allows borrowing from pieces of music so long as the
borrower pays a fee for doing so. Such a system would be more sensitive
to the realities of today and the historical practices and idiosyncrasies of
the world of music. We should also consider altering the test for music
copyright infringement by having it be guided by the reactions of actual
auditors for whom the music was composed. Shifting the focus away
surveyed was improperly limited in that it excluded important segments of the universe of
prospective purchasers of the Reflex Action."); see also Shashank Upadhye, Trademark Sur-
veys: Identifying The Relevant Universe of Confused Consumers, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 549, 591 (1998) ("It can be difficult to identify the relevant universe of
consumers whose confusion must be proved in a trademark infringement case.").
214. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana Products, Inc., 583 F Supp. 1091, 1094
(S.D.N.Y. 1982). In Coca-Cola, despite Coca-Cola's submission of survey evidence purport-
ing to show that an advertisement misled consumers into believing that Tropicana juice was
unprocessed, the court denied Coca-Cola's motion for a preliminary injunction of the defen-
dant's television advertising for its ready-to-serve Premium Pack orange juice. Although the
survey indicated that 43 percent of the responses of 500 subjects said that Tropicana's juice
was "fresh," the survey failed to elicit evidence of what people meant by the freshness con-
cept. As noted by the court, "[Coca-Cola's expert witness] admitted that 'fresh' is capable of
several connotations, among them 'not processed,' 'not made from concentrate,' 'refreshing'
and '100 percent pure." Id. at 1096-97.
215. See Grinvalsky, supra note 202, at 427.
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from the hypothetical listener would be more sensitive to auditory reali-
ties and would provide a more predictable gauge for assessing the
complex question of whether a piece of music appropriates protectable
expression.
